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Conclusion: The Social Condenser – A Thing in Itself?  
 
In his 1968 paper ‘The Use of an Object’, psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott describes how 
‘relating may be to a subjective object, but usage implies that the object is part of external 
reality’.1 For Winnicott, to use an object is to take into account its objective reality or 
existence as ‘a thing in itself’ rather than its subjective reality or existence as a projection. 
The change from relating to using is for him significant, as it ‘means that the subject destroys 
the object’ and that the object stands outside the omnipotent control of the subject, 
recognized as the external object it has always been.2  
 
The conversation Michał and I had with the architects now in charge of the restoration of 
the Narkomfin – Natalya Shilova, and Alexey Ginzburg, the grandson of Moisei Ginzburg, the 
building’s original designer – marked a turning point in my own relation to the Narkomin. 
This was a moment where I had to face up to the fact that I had been ‘relating’ to the social 
condenser, in Winnicott’s words, projecting my aspirations onto it, according to my need to 
find a socialist design history and typology to inspire me.3 I had been reading all that I could 
find (in English translation) about its history; but this had turned out to be a reading with the 
designer’s intention, reinforcing my act of relating to the building, rather than a reading 
against it or according to those uses that come after design and can involve appropriation. 
In trying to understand the Narkomfin historically, I had discovered its architect’s intentions, 
and since those intentions coincided with my own, this meant that I turned its objective 
reality and existence as ‘a thing in itself’ to own ends. Encountering Alexey and his strong 
scepticism about the building as a socialist icon and his grandfather’s Marxist intentions 
made me wonder about my own idealism (again). 
 
Self-reflection is a theme that threads though many of the contributions to this special issue 
– wistful and in some cases passionate desires for socialist societies are critically re-valued 
through a careful attention to historical detail and to the contemporary context. Several of 
the authors have considering again their earlier attachments to ideas and architecture, 
revisited concepts and memories of places that once inspired them, and examine afresh 
sites of aspiration and hope in their own previous work. Victor Buchli’s essay is a beautiful 
example of this, in which the Narkomfin shifts from the centerpiece of his previous 
ethnography – a groundbreaking investigation and analysis of building and its designers and 
occupants over decades – to become a palimpsest or motif of the process of condensation 
itself. This is why the transdisciplinarity of this issue shapes the ways in which we return to 
the Narkomfin, through not only architecture, but also art theory, psychoanalysis, and 
ethnography. As Michał Murawski’s article also shows, the ethnographer’s sustained and 
deep-digging into the specificities of the uses of social condensers as they change over time, 
is so important in offering an understanding of occupation that is often eclipsed in 
architectural theory by the return – time and again – to the architect’s intentions.  
 
The fact that Alexei is the grandson of the original designer of the building – Moisei Ginzberg 
– makes him a blood relative. I did feel closer to the origins of the building sitting next to him. 
And when we were talking, I hoped somehow that through his breath, the truth of the 
building’s history would emerge. One good reason, I reflect in retrospect, not to mix oral 
interviews with archival research. How can a piece of dry paper win over a human voice, 
with all its styles of persuasion? As a materialist historian I knew of course that to hope like 
this is wrong, and then again, I sensed that somewhere in Alexey there was matter relating 
to his grandfather. But through our conversation, such hopes were dashed, in Alexei’s 
refutation of the socialist origins of the social condenser as an architectural type.  
 
Alexey’s determination is to write history such that the social condensing in the Narkomfin 
can be understood, on the one hand, as a result of the increasing density of cities, 
specifically Moscow, and on the other, as fitting with the desire of Soviet designers to 
produce artefacts and spaces in the international style. The decision to offer a choice of 
apartment types, and minimal kitchens following the European approach, in the Narkomin, 
is not for him an intention to ‘crystallise’ the new byt under socialism, but a design decision 
taken as a sign of the times – globalisation, industrialisation, urbanisation.  
 
Michał and I took Alexey’s refutation of our reading of Ginzberg’s claims in his texts from 
Sovremmenaia Arkhitektura (SA) as a challenge. In re-examining those texts, extractions and 
quotes that had been translated from Russian to English, we realised there were several 
quite problematic discrepancies with the secondary sources – either a lack of precision 
concerning the source of the original or no citation at all. We also realised that there were a 
number of texts, many by Ginzburg, which were often referred to, but had never been 
translated into English. So we decided to get these key sources translated, and in some cases 
retranslated, from the Russian originals. These have been incredibly helpful for resituating 
Ginzburg’s own voice back into the arguments over the building and its intention that have 
ensued way beyond his death. The translations from the 1920s provide a strong sense of the 
context and manner of architectural theoretical argument at that time; the important issues 
at stake, the need to make claims powerfully, and to refute criticism. So I think we can say 
safely now, contra his grandson, that these sources do provide evidence of Ginzburg as the 
designer of social condensers with socialist aims. But this is certainly not the end of the story. 
Key questions still stand, for example, on the relation between form and function as they are 
styled in architectural theory, or between material and consciousness as Andrew Willimott 
and Nick Beech discuss in their essays here. Not least, can architecture determine 
behaviour? And from a more historical perspective, were these social condensers intended 
to change social relations or to respond to the change in social relations?  
 
Environmental determinism. Now today, this is a discredited idea, that architectural form 
can determine social relations, most would reject this in favour of a more interactive way of 
approaching the relation between form and behaviour, function, programme or use. For my 
part, I would still rather follow the potential of the Marxist geographers’ notion, which was 
highly influential in the late 1990s, of the ‘socio-spatial dialectic’ (from Edward Soja’s reading 
of Henry Lefebvre),4 that spaces can change people, but that people can change spaces. 
Ginzburg, and the Russian-speaking commentators on Ginzburg coming some 40-50 years 
later, use a variety of different terms to describe the relation between the spatial and the 
social or design and use, translated into English as assist, crystallize, encourage, facilitate, 
focus, foster, generate, induce, promote, permit, and stimulate. However, the concept of 
environmental determinism has recently returned under a different guise, at least in housing 
discourse via outfits such as Create Streets who wish to argue that living in houses rather 
than high-rise apartments does and will make people happier.5  
 
Social scientists using tools such as space syntax argue that behaviour is influenced by spatial 
form. But even if it is possible to track patterns of movement what can those traces really 
tell us about what people want? We talk of desire lines, how one can choose to take a short 
cut to get from A to B, across the mud and the grass, rather than to go the long way around 
the concrete path following the designer’s intentions. But what can these so called ‘desire-
lines’ really tell us about what people were hoping and dreaming when they performed such 
movements? Just because someone ended up living in a flat in Moscow without a kitchen, 
can we ever know whether they aspired to social revolution? 
 
As Willimott argues, in a manner that parallels Alexey Ginzburg’s thinking in form, but is 
asserted for a wholly different set of reasons, (like the social condenser itself, we might 
argue), by looking at a range of archival sources, it is necessary for us to consider the social 
condenser as a response to behaviours that already existed, rather than a prop architects 
put in place in order to encourage the social transformations in users that they were hoping 
for. Thought of this way, the Narkomfin and other social condensers of the transitional type, 
can be understood as designs for new buildings that match the social transformations in 
users’ behaviours – aspirational, desirous, political – rather than as buildings that predict 
and dictate those new behaviours – this, Willimott argues, is what the primary evidence 
shows.  
 
If so, did those living collectively do so out of necessity, because of the shortage of housing, 
or because they wanted to try socialism? Were those communal kitchens shared because it 
was cheaper, or because of the ideal of communal living was aspired to? And what became 
of the social condenser as it was reworked in the London of the late 1950s, and then into 
1960s? Was the UK really full of social condensers as late as the 1970s – on the Aylesbury 
Estate, as I suggest, and in the arts centres that Andrea Phillips discusses? And is it going too 
far to suggest that the welfare state was a social condenser? It was an attempt to reduce 
wealth disparity, that we know, but not to redistribute wealth. So if there was no intention 
of social change or revolution, is the staircase at Bevin Court designed by Russian émigré 
architect Berthold Lubetkin, simply to be read, for example, as a functional or economically 
determined statement? 
 
In his essay in this volume, Owen Hatherley goes back over his early work, questioning his 
reading Moscow’s social condensers of the 1920s, and re-visiting what he is now calling 
‘actually-existing social condensers’, for what they are today. His forensic examination of 
these icons of socialist modernism is a salutary tale, which prompts us to ask, how far can 
the concept and the typology of the social condenser be translated across time, as well as 
culture and place? Is such an architectural type historically and materially determined or can 
it be refigured today? And what is at stake in arguing for the need to look back at its point 
and purpose of origin today?  
 
The image of both the social condensers of Moscow and those built in their image elsewhere 
and decades later, is one often viewed through a nostalgic eye, and with tendency to 
eulogise. The gaze which looks back has an inbuilt tendency to focus on what has been lost, 
because it is looking for what was and so can be no more. But an attempt to re-build an 
image of ‘lost’ social condensation, as one might discern from my own essay here, as well as 
those of Nick Beech and Phillips, might be worth it – if at least to remember what it is that is 
being destroyed, especially when the alternatives being offered are deceptive and cruel. Can 
the social condenser be more to us than a lost object, can anything be more than that? Well, 
as Winnicott points out, a use object – as a thing in itself – may have more agency. 
 
Agency is important, so is action, possibility, and projection. The future face, the looking 
forward, of the social condenser is an important counterpart to the looking back. The 
architectural design project has this at its heart – the projection of a future intention, a new 
series of actions to be performed in and through built form. And such project(ions) do not 
have to determine future use. A form designed for one purpose in the past, can also be used 
for something different in the present, or future, as Bernard Tschumi has suggested in his 
design tactics of dis-, cross- and trans-programming, where one function can be laid on top 
of another providing the potential for multiple programmes to critique and destabilise each 
other.6 The example of ‘Arry’s Bar which I discuss in my essay, is interesting to consider in 
terms of trans-programming, where one programme gets laid over another not normally 
associated with it, here a public planning inquiry over a bar at a football club. But whether or 
not this creates a dis-programming, where one programme can be overturned and 
potentially undo the other, depends on specific patterns of use themselves: how far is that 
public inquiry aiding this council to dispossess those residents of their homes, or helping to 
protect their human rights; are the usual bar-time drinkers, fans or managers; does one 
group of people ever get to meet the other?  
 
Is anyone today inventing new typologies, or setting the conditions for cross-, trans- or dis-
programming? The era of the grand project is over, and we are operating on the back foot in 
a mode that is exhaustingly outraged and permanently resisting, always having to say no, 
rather than yes. And even if we build a new yes, how long can a form or programme 
constructed in the service (or even hope) of radical social change last, before it is co-opted? 
These questions need considering more carefully through the scope of what Łukasz Stanek 
writes here as occurring in the shift from functionalism to desire and pleasure, or what 
Phillips describes as resubjectification. This brings into focus architecture’s relation to 
emotion, to feelings as well as behaviours, to psychoanalysis as well as psychology.  
 The close connection between architecture and psychoanalysis is present in a word like 
‘condensation’, which Sigmund Freud deployed, along with ‘displacement’, to discuss the 
psychic mechanisms of the dream work. He described these mechanisms in his 1900 The 
Interpretation of Dreams, 7 translated into Russian in 1913.8 While condensation may be a 
form of compression (and we can, as Alexey did, observe that people get compressed in 
cities), this does not mean we know what they will do when they are compressed. Perhaps 
under compression or condensation will do something completely unexpected? 
 
When the dream work condenses, two different thoughts come together in a new and 
ambiguous state, where the distinctions held by each original are lost. Ostranenie? Perhaps. 
In a translation of a key text by Lev Vygotsky, who brought Freud and Marx together around 
the notion of conditional reflexes, ‘develop[ing] a system of “reflexological Freudian 
psychology” in the spirit of dialectical materialism’,9 we find these two terms in adjacency: 
‘ “condensation” (ostranenie) ’.10  Condensation was a term Vygotsky used to understand the 
interaction of external and inner speech; and yet the appearance of the term ostranenie 
beside it (as Vygotsky’s translation or perhaps the translator’s) firmly signals its intended 
relation to Victor Shklovsky’s concept of defamiliarisation or making strange. Was this 
Vygotsky’s suggested translation or an idea of the translator’s? We can never know for 
certain, nor can we know if if Moisei Ginzberg read Freud. But we can be certain that, under 
condensation, things defamiliarise.  
 
Michel de Certeau argues that: 
 
Psychoanalysis and historiography […] conceive of the relation between the past and 
the present differently. Psychoanalysis recognizes the past in the present; 
historiography places them beside one another. […] Two strategies of time thus 
confront one another.11 
 
Here in this special issue we have placed an appendix of translations of original Russian 
sources on the social condenser from the 1920s beside a series of essays discussing the 
relevance of the concept and the typology for the present. The act of reading is such that the 
past is no longer beside but in the present: is this is what happens when the social condenser 
socially condenses? 
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